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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between central bank independence
and inflation in Latin America, using the experience of Colombia (1923-2008)
as a case study. Since its creation, in 1923, Colombia’s central bank has
undergone several reforms that have changed its objectives and degree of
independence. Between 1923 and 1951, it was private and independent, with
a legal commitment to price stability. In 1962, monetary responsibilities
were divided between a government-dominated monetary board, in charge of
monetary policies, and the central bank, which carried them out. In the early
1990s, the bank recovered its independence and its focus on price stability.
Inflation varied substantially during these subperiods. Our analysis suggests
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that the central bank independence, combined with a commitment to price
stability, renders the best results in terms of price stability.
Keywords: inflation, central bank, independence, Latin America, Colombia
JEL Code: N16, N26
RESUMEN
Este documento explora la relacio´n entre la independencia del banco
central y los niveles de inflacio´n en Latinoame´rica, usando como estudio de
caso la experiencia de Colombia (1923-2008). Desde su creacio´n en 1923, la
independencia y objetivos del banco central en Colombia han sido mo-
dificados substancialmente. Entre 1923 y 1951, el banco central fue privado e
independiente, y con objetivo principal la estabilidad de precios. En 1962, la
responsabilidad monetaria fue dividida entre la Junta Monetaria, encargada
del disen˜o de la polı´tica monetaria, y el banco central, que se encargaba de
ejecutarla. A principios de los 1990s, el banco recobro´ su independencia y su
objetivo fue el control de la inflacio´n. Los niveles de inflacio´n fueron dife-
rentes en estos periodos. El ana´lisis sugiere que la combinacio´n entre un
banco central independiente y un objetivo de estabilidad de precios produce
los mejores resultados en te´rminos de estabilizacio´n de precios.
Palabras clave: inflacio´n, independencia, banco central, Latinoame´rica,
Colombia
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the relationship between the institutional reforms
that the Colombian central bank, Banco de la Repu´blica, has undergone since
its creation in 1923 and the level and variability of the country’s rate of
inflation. Over the past decade, there has been an abundant empirical lit-
erature on the relationship between central bank independence and inflation.
This body of literature, however, usually employs cross-section statistical
analysis. Thus, there are important country-specific characteristics that have
not been taken into consideration. For this reason, it is fruitful to examine
country-specific historical experiences in depth. Colombia is an interesting
case study in this respect, since its central bank is one of the two oldest banks
in Latin America and has experienced distinct subperiods in which its
objectives and degree of autonomy have varied. Recently, it has been argued
that the central bank has seen its real independence reduced, as a result of
the introduction of the re-election of the President of the Republic in 2006.
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Our analysis finds that the central bank has operated under different
degrees of autonomy and different mandates in its almost 90 years of history.
Each of these institutional arrangements has resulted in different outcomes
in terms of price variability. The best, in terms of low inflation, coincided
with the latest period (1992-2008) in which the central bank’s mandate was
to protect the purchasing parity of the currency and it was made independent
to achieve that goal.
In the next section, we review the recent empirical literature on the
relationship between central bank independence and inflation. We then
present the Colombian case. In the fourth section, we discuss whether there
was a structural break in the inflation rate in the early 1990s as a result of the
change in central bank legislation ushered by the Constitution of 1991.
Finally, we present some conclusions.
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In 1973, with the generalized increase in inflation after the end of the
Bretton Woods agreements, under which fixed exchange rates worked
as nominal anchors, several proposals to achieve price stability were put
forward. One of the first came from Milton Friedman. Friedman argued that
price stability could be achieved by allowing central banks to pursue a
monetary policy based on a fixed rule announced every year. It can be shown,
however, that commitment to such a rule is not an optimal strategy because
it makes central banks too inflexible to deal with unanticipated shocks,
particularly on the supply side (Rogoff 1985).
In 1976, Hayek (1976) proposed a more radical strategy to achieve price
stability. His argument was based on the denationalization of money, and his
core idea was that private banks should issue their own currencies — currencies
that were not convertible against each other. Under this proposal, banks would
have the incentive to obtain funds from consumers at no cost by encouraging
them to hold their own currency. This is known as a «free-banking» regime.
As a result of Hayek’s «eccentric» proposal, interest increased in the study
of the historical experience with free banking. Under the free-banking sys-
tem, there are no barriers to entry and there is no centralized control of
international reserves (Schuler 1992). The arrangement existed in many
countries before the consolidation of a system with a central bank with a
monopoly on the issuance of currency.
Traditional economic historiography, particularly in the United States,
took a strong negative view of the experience with free banking, given that
this system was said to «overprint» money. According to this view, free-
banking regimes would inevitably end in massive withdrawals of deposits
and banking panics. More recently, research by economic historians, such as
Rockoff (1974), Rolnick and Weber (1983) and White (1984) has contributed
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to the analysis of a wide variety of international historical experiences with
free banking. These authors found that free-banking regimes were generally
successful in achieving price stability.
Despite the historical evidence supporting the success of free banking in
achieving price stability, it has very few supporters at present. The problem is
that it is unclear how a system of free banking can be introduced without
going back to a gold or silver standard. Thus, at present, the attractiveness of
the free-banking system is very limited (Sechrest 1993).
A less radical approach to achieve price stability is that which postulates
an autonomous central bank. In fact, since the 1980s, this idea has gained
support (Cukierman 2008). Part of this support stems from the success of the
Bundesbank (one of the most autonomous central banks in the world) in
achieving a relatively low rate of inflation for several decades. For the period
1970-1990, the average inflation rate in the Federal Republic of Germany was
3.8 per cent, the lowest among the main economies of the world.
How does the central bank independence yield lower inflation rates?
There are at least three mechanisms. First, some authors who hold the
«public choice view», such as Buchanan and Wagner, argue that without
independence, there is strong pressure on the central bank to behave in line
with the preferences of the government. As Buchanan and Wagner put it,
A monetary decision maker is in a position only one stage removed from
that of the directly elected politician. He will normally have been
appointed to office by a politician subject to electoral testing, and he may
even serve at the pleasure of the latter. It is scarcely to be expected that
persons who are chosen as monetary decision makers will be the sort that
are likely to take policy stances sharply contrary to those desired by their
political associates, especially since these stances would also run counter
to strong public opinion and media pressures y ‘Easy money’ is also
‘easy’ for the monetary managery (de Haan and Sturm 1992).
A second mechanism through which greater central bank independence
yields lower inflation is that governments with discretional powers over
monetary policy have the incentive to follow an expansionist path to achieve
short-term reductions in unemployment. As this instrument is used more
and more often, feeding price-rise expectations, inflation increases without
having any effect on employment. For this reason, an autonomous central
bank will achieve lower inflation in this context without affecting the real
sector of the economy.
The third mechanism is suggested by Sargent and Wallace (1981), who
point out that when fiscal policy is dominant — that is, when the central
bank cannot influence the size of the fiscal deficit — money supply becomes
endogenous. If, on the other hand, monetary policy is the dominant policy,
fiscal authorities will be forced to reduce the fiscal deficit.
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Perhaps the idea of central bank independence owes its current popu-
larity more to the international empirical evidence concerning its positive
effects than to the theoretical arguments. In fact, since the pioneering
work of Bade and Parkin (1985), several other studies have found statistical
evidence consistent with the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between
the degree of central bank independence and the inflation rate (Alesina
1988)1.
One of the first studies to analyze the relationship between central bank
independence and price stability is that of Bade and Parkin (1985), who
examine the experiences of twelve developed countries in the period after
Bretton Woods. They constructed a measure of central bank independence
that takes a value of one, when independence is at the minimal level, and
four, when independence is at the highest. The results show that the degree
of independence, as measured by their index, is an important factor for
determining the level of inflation, and that the two countries with the highest
central bank independence in the sample (Germany and Switzerland) had
inflation rates below the average for the sample. On the other hand, they
found no differences in the inflation rates of countries whose central banks
were classified as less independent. Alesina (1988) adds four more countries
(Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and Spain) to the Bade and Parkin sample,
and shows that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of inde-
pendence of the central bank and the average inflation level in the period
1973-1985.
Other studies using different types of independence index also find evi-
dence consistent with these results. Grilli et al. (1991), for example, develop
two types of index to capture different facets of central bank independence:
one measures economic independence and the other, political independence.
In their regression analysis of inflation, they used data for the period 1950-
1989 and a sample of eighteen developed countries. They found that central
bank independence indexes always have the correct sign (negative). In
addition, the coefficient of the economic independence of the central bank is
statistically significant in periods of high inflation, and the political inde-
pendence index is statistically significant in the 1970s. Although not con-
clusive, these results are indicative of a potential association between the
central bank independence and inflation.
Despite the evidence presented by these early studies, it was not clear how
robust these results would be with a more representative sample of countries,
and, in particular, how these results would change with the inclusion of
developing countries. Cukierman et al. (1992) partially addressed both these
concerns by using a sample of seventy-two countries, of which fifty-one were
developing nations. Their results were consistent with the earlier literature in
1 See Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), Berger et al. (2001) and Cukierman (2008) for thorough
reviews of the literature on the central bank independence.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 87
that they found a negative correlation between the central bank indepen-
dence and inflation. This result, however, is only found for the industrialized
countries in their sample. The authors argued that, in developing countries,
«formal» central bank independence can differ from «actual» independence.
For this reason, they use indicators of real independence, such as the political
vulnerability of the central bank governor, as measured by the probability of
a change of governor giving a change in the government. As expected, they
find a statistically positive relationship between inflation and the political
vulnerability of the central bank governor. Since these authors find that for
developing countries there is Granger causality in both directions between
inflation and the vulnerability of the central bank governor, the role of
autonomy in shaping inflation is not as clear as for the subsample of
developed countries.
The main characteristic of the studies described above is that they use
cross-section analysis. It is very unlikely that the correlations thus estimated
reflect the true interrelation between the autonomy of the central bank and
the dynamics of inflation. Alesina (1988), for example, points out that this
correlation can arise because countries that prefer low inflation may also
prefer independent central banks. In other words, there might be some
unobserved characteristics correlated with central bank independence that,
if not controlled for in the regressions, will cause the coefficient on inde-
pendence to be biased. In a recent study, Crowe and Meade (2008), using
longitudinal data to eliminate country-fixed effects and using their own
measure of central bank independence, find evidence of an inverse relation
between independence of the central bank and inflation2. This implies that,
even when controlling for country heterogeneity and shocks that affect all
countries simultaneously, the inverse relation between central bank inde-
pendence and inflation still persists.
For the specific case of Latin America, Ja´come and Va´zquez (2008) have
produced what is perhaps the most complete empirical analysis of the rela-
tionship between the central bank independence and inflation. Their study
uses data for twenty-four countries in the period 1985-2002. The authors use
longitudinal information and panel data methods to overcome some of the
limitations of the earlier studies. In particular, they are able to account for
time-invariant variables related to inflation and to take into account shocks
that affect all countries in the same year (e.g. the reforms of the 1990s). They
find that, on average, countries with more independent central banks (as
measured by four indicators of legal and actual independence) have lower
inflation rates during the period. This finding is in sharp contrast with earlier
studies, such as de Hann and Kooi (2000) and Ja´come (2001), which were
unable to find a strong relationship between these two variables in the case of
2 This study also calculates measures of the central bank transparency and relates them to
inflation rates.
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developing countries3. Studies using alternative measures of the central bank
independence (e.g whether countries include legal independence in the
constitution) also found a negative correlation with inflation, perhaps
because this measure captures commitment with price stability more suc-
cessfully and because constitutional measures are more likely to be enforced
and implemented (Gutie´rrez 2003)4.
Despite the recent focus of the literature on panel data methods and
cross-country regressions, other authors take a different empirical approach
by focusing on the experience of particular countries5. For example, Otero
and Ramı´rez (2006) use a pure time-series model of the determinants of
inflation to test statistically whether the reform of the independence of the
central bank in the early 1990s in Colombia changed the parameters of
the model. They found that both internal and external factors are important
in explaining the inflation rate (at least in the Colombian case), and that
re-establishing the independence of the central bank changes the parameters
of the model. In particular, they found that disequilibria in the goods and
money markets had a larger effect on inflation before the central bank was
made independent in 19916.
An alternative approach for the analysis of the relationship between
the independence of the central bank and price stability is a careful review
of country cases. One advantage of case studies is the possibility of carrying
out deeper analysis over a relatively longer period of time and taking
advantage of changes in the degree of autonomy of the central bank over
time. Colombia is an interesting case in this respect because, since its
creation in 1923, the central bank has acted under different degrees of
independence.
3. THE CASE OF COLOMBIA, 1923-2008
Colombia has one the most varied experiences with central banking in
Latin America, since it was the second country in the region to establish such
3 Some papers also find no evidence of a relationship between the central bank independence
and inflation in industrialized countries. Daunfeldt and De Luna (2008), for example, find that price
stability is achieved before more independence is given to central banks in OECD countries.
4 For an analysis of the reforms that lead to the creation of the independent central banks in
Latin America, see Bonnet and Vargas (1994), Carstens and Ja´come (2005) and Ja´come (2008).
5 For the Colombian experience, see Echeverri (1991), Meisel (1992), Restrepo (2000),
Kalmanovitz (2003) and Giraldo Palomino (2007).
6 In terms of the legal independence of the central bank in Colombia, one important question
is how the legal powers given to the central bank in the early 1990s are compared to the legal
framework of successful central banks in other countries. Go´mez Mejı´a (1997) undertakes a
comparative analysis of the laws determining the central bank independence in several countries.
He finds that the legal structure that defined the central bank in Colombia is similar to that of
successful European central banks, and concludes that, at least in theory, this gives the central bank
in Colombia a good chance of succeeding in controlling inflation.
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an institution7. In addition, since its creation in 1923, under the direction of
the American advisor, Edwin W. Kemmerer, the Banco de la Repu´blica has
undergone several major reforms that seem to have influenced the degree of
its autonomy vis-0a-vis the central government. Thus, it is an ideal case to
study the interrelationships between the degree of central bank indepen-
dence and the level and variability of the rate of inflation.
To establish the main subperiods in the history of the Banco de la Repu´blica,
two aspects were taken into consideration: whether formal autonomy was
existed and the main objectives were established for the central bank by law.
Note that we explicitly avoided using the behavior of inflation to define
the subperiods. Using the above two criteria, it is possible to identify four
subperiods (see Table 1). Figure 1 presents the evolution of inflation since the
creation of the central bank in 1923 and shows the four subperiods.
When the Colombian central bank was created in 1923, a clear commit-
ment with the stability of the purchasing power of the peso convertible to
gold and the smooth functioning of the gold standard was established by law.
To further maintain this commitment, it was determined that the institution
would be a private bank, with the government among its stockholders. At this
time, many other countries were establishing independent central banks,
TABLE 1
MAIN SUBPERIODS IN THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLOMBIAN
CENTRAL BANK (1923 TO PRESENT)
Period
Name of the
central bank Nature Main objective
Commitment to
price stability?
1923-1951 Banco de la
Repu´blica
Private and
autonomous
Price stability Yes
1952-1963 Banco de la
Repu´blica
Private and
autonomous
Price stability
and «rapid
economic
development»
No
1964-1991 Junta
Monetaria
State-owned
with no
autonomy
Management of
monetary,
exchange rate
and credit
policies
No
1992-present Banco de la
Repu´blica
State-owned
and
autonomous
Price stability Yes
7 For an analysis of the development and evolution of the Colombian financial system during
the 20th century, see Urrutia Montoya and Caballero Arga´ez (2006).
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and the most influential academic economists were also promoting them.
For example, at the International Conference of Finance, held in Brussels
in 1920, a call was made for every country to create an autonomous central
bank (Deane and Pringle 1994).
In Colombia, the gold standard was maintained until 1931. Subsequently,
the nominal exchange was kept fixed, except in the period 1933-1935, when
the peso was devalued with respect to the U.S. dollar. Thus, during the period
1923-1951, the money supply was endogenous and the level of inflation
was determined by the level of inflation of the main trading partners, basi-
cally the United States. Thus, the correlation coefficient between the level
of inflation in Colombia and the United States for this first subperiod was
62 per cent.
It can be said that the central bank autonomy and the commitment to
price stability in the period 1923-1951 produced a relatively low-average
yearly rate of inflation (5.6 per cent). However, the variability of the inflation
rate, as measured by the standard deviation around the linear trend, was
the highest among the four subperiods that we are discussing (see Table 2).
FIGURE 1
INFLATION RATE IN COLOMBIA (1923-2008)
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Note: The vertical lines coincide with the years of major reforms to the autonomy of the central bank.
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As the money supply was endogenous and the inflation rate depended on the
international rate of inflation, the explanation for the enormous variability of
its level is found in events related to the world economy: the Great Depres-
sion and the reduction of inflation it produced, and World War II, which in
Colombia generated price rises because of lower imports of key supplies,
which in turn led to an enormous increase in international reserves.
Beginning in the late 1940s, there was broad discussion in Colombia
concerning different proposals to reform the central bank. One of the issues
most often raised was the credit policy, which was seen as too orthodox.
Some of the promoters of the reform wanted the Banco de la Repu´blica to
play an active role in economic development through the granting of long-
term subsidized credit. With this intention, in 1949, the government invited
Richard Grove and Gerald Alter, of the Federal Reserve Bank, to study the
Colombian financial system and recommend changes. Their proposals were
presented in two documents written in 1950 (Grove and Alter 1986a, b). The
main aspects of what they proposed were included in Decree 756 of 1951,
which redefined the instruments at the disposal of the central bank as well as
its objectives. In its first article, this decree was very clear about the new
perspective that would guide the central bank: «y the Banco de la Repu´blica
will carry out a monetary, credit, and exchange rate policy oriented toward
stimulating the conditions for the accelerated development of the Colombian
economy.» As a result of the changes in the central bank legislation carried
through in 1951, subsidized credit, cre´dito de fomento, increased from 7.6 per
cent of the total credit in 1952 to 15.0 per cent by 1960.
The new economic philosophy, which had started to dominate monetary
policy in the early 1950s, led to a reduction in price stability. However, since
there were still fixed exchange rates, monetary expansion led to cycles of
TABLE 2
SOME MONETARY INDICATORS FOR THE MAIN SUBPERIODS IN THE HISTORY
OF THE COLOMBIAN CENTRAL BANK
Period
Inflation rate
(mean)
Coefficient on
trend(a)
Standard
deviation around
linear trend(b)
Was inflation
higher than in the
previous period?
1923-1951 5.6 0.49 (0.23) 10.4
1952-1963 9.3 1.29 (0.67) 7.6 Yes
1964-1991 19.8 0.71 (0.12) 5.0 Yes
1992-2008 12.5 21.37 (0.15) 2.9 No
(a) This figure is the coefficient on a linear trend that comes from an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression of inflation on a constant and a linear trend. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
(b) This is the standard deviation of the residuals from an OLS regression of inflation on a constant and a
linear trend.
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price increase, revaluation of the peso vs. the U.S. dollar, and, eventually, to a
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. This is why the period is known in
Colombian macroeconomic history as that of «stop-go» policies. Thus, it can
be said that the period 1951-1963 was very unstable from a macroeconomic
point of view — inflation almost doubled and its deviation from the trend
was also high (see Table 2).
Beginning in the 1940s, it was often argued that it was inappropriate for
the Banco de la Repu´blica to be a private bank. Finally, in 1962, a way around
the private nature of the central bank, similar to steps taken in Paraguay
(1944), Guatemala (1945) and Ecuador (1948), was proposed: the creation of
a government-controlled monetary board (Junta Monetaria). As a result,
since 1963, the Colombian central bank has been divided between a mone-
tary board, which determined monetary, credit and exchange rate policies,
and the Banco de la Repu´blica, which implemented these policies.
The monetary board never had a clear commitment to the stability of
the purchasing power of the peso. In this respect, the Minister of Finance at
the time was very clear about the consequences of the lack of autonomy of
the monetary board with respect to the government:
If governments are bad, there will be bad monetary management, and
a bad and difficult situation for the country. If governments are good,
the situation will improve for the country. But it is the state, repre-
sented by the government, that ought to direct monetary policy (Sanz
de Santamarı´a 1965, p. 228).
A possible consequence of the loss of central bank autonomy was a sig-
nificant increase in the average level of inflation, which rose to an annual rate
of 19.8 per cent, during the period 1964-1991. Although the variability of the
average inflation rate fell with respect to the earlier period, it was still high.
This reduction could perhaps be explained by the adoption of a crawling
peg regime in 1967, which eliminated the abrupt devaluations of the period
1952-1963 and the stop-go macroeconomic cycles (Figures 2 and 3).
In 1991, Colombia approved a new constitution. One of the most important
economic reforms it brought about was the re-establishment of the central
bank autonomy. The monetary board was abolished and the Banco de la
Repu´blica regained the control of monetary and credit policy. Since, in 1973, it
had been converted into a government bank (the government became the
controlling stockholder), this reform did not simply represent a return to the
situation of the period 1923-1951. Now, the Banco de la Repu´blica also con-
trolled all aspects of exchange rate policy, an important aspect of economic
policy, which, before 1991, had been in the hands of Congress.
Law 31 of 1992, which developed the new constitutional obligations of the
central bank, established very clearly that its main goal was to maintain the
purchasing power of the peso. To assure the independence of the Banco de la
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History 93
Repu´blica, the law also determined that each President of Colombia, midway
through his term of office, would appoint two of the five members of the board
of directors. These members are appointed for successive periods of 4 years and
can stay in office for a maximum of three periods (12 years). In turn, the
members of the board of directors, in conjunction with the Minister of Finance
(who presides the board) appoint the general manager (President) for a period of
4 years. The general manager may be re-elected for a maximum of two periods.
The complete board of directors of the Banco de la Repu´blica is composed
of the five members, plus the Minister of Finance and the general manager.
FIGURE 2
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF INFLATION
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Thus, theoretically, of the seven members, each President would appoint a
maximum of three, but for two of them, the appointment only coincides with
the last 2 years of that presidential period. However, since 1991, presidents
have appointed at least three members of the board (in addition to the
Minister), because it has been common for board members to resign before
the end of the 4-year period. In addition, in 2006, the Constitution was
changed to allow for the re-election of the President of the Republic. Thus, a
re-elected President, as has happened with Alvaro Uribe in the period 2006-
2010, appoints at least four board members plus the Minister, which leads to
a clear majority. For this reason, some critics argue that presidential re-
election has weakened the autonomy of the central bank. Others, never-
theless, argue that the constitutional mandate of the central bank to preserve
the purchasing power of the currency is so clear that it does not matter that
one president may eventually appoint a majority of the board members.
Finally, others believe that this will depend to a great extent on the quality of
the appointees. If, as has happened until now, high-level professional econo-
mists are named, the independence of the bank will be preserved. This situa-
tion, however, does not prevent the possibility that if politically motivated
designations predominate, things could be different and the central bank could
fall under the complete control of the government in office. In sum, presidential
re-election has potentially reduced the autonomy of the central bank8.
Despite this apparent reduction in the independence of the bank, there
are strong reasons to believe that this has not been the case. Such reasons
include (i) the attributes and professional qualities of the candidates for the
board, (ii) the way in which the bank reveals information on the decisions
taken by the board and (iii) the way in which decisions are made within the
board and the resolutions of disagreements.
First, although the President has complete freedom to choose the mem-
bers of the board that he is entitled to, he also has an incentive to send a
strong signal about the economic responsibility of his decision through the
professional attributes of the members he chooses. The selection of members
with dubious qualifications, on the contrary, would send a negative signal to
economic agents in all sectors of the economy, and would jeopardize the
credibility of the government on economic matters. Given this, it is not
surprising that the members whom the government has chosen so far have
been reputable, well-known professionals in the field of economics with long
and outstanding careers in either the public or private sectors. However,
appointing members with these attributes makes it less possible for the
government to influence their decisions.
The way in which the bank makes the information on the monetary policy
decision-making process public also plays an important role in maintaining
8 Kalmanovitz (2003) also carries out an analysis of the degree of autonomy of the central bank
in Colombia and concludes that autonomy is real but limited.
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the independence of the bank9. As part of the implementation of the infla-
tion-targeting strategy and the transparency that this strategy requires, since
2007, the bank has made the result of the voting public when there is dis-
agreement among the members of the board. Since the implementation of
inflation targeting, one of the main decisions that the board has taken is to
either increase or decrease the interbank interest rate (the main instrument
of the inflation-targeting policy). Although more information is provided to
the public and the government under this scheme, only the aggregate results
of the voting are released. In other words, information on how each parti-
cular member of the board voted is not provided in the press releases. Only
when a decision has been made with complete unanimity, it is possible to
infer the individual votes of the board members. What is the effect of this
situation on independence? It means that the government is unable to hold
the members it appoints, including the Finance Minister, publicly accoun-
table. This situation gives these members, as well as the rest of the board, the
opportunity to deviate from the opinions of the government and to act on
their own judgments concerning the best policy to support without having to
respond individually for their actions.
One additional institutional arrangement that could contribute to the
independence of the bank is the way in which decisions are taken and
policies implemented within the board. It has been established that any
decision taken by the board must be based on a technical document prepared
by the relevant staff of the bank (most of the time the Economic Studies Unit
or the Monetary and Reserves Unit). Early in the week in which a board
meeting is to take place a «pre-board meeting» is held. In addition to the staff
members of the bank who prepared the technical document, all the members
of the board have attended this meeting, except the Minister of Finance, who
is represented by his deputy. The objective of this meeting is to discuss the
technical document prepared by the bank’s staff and to give the board
members a chance to express their views on the technical document. It is
important to highlight that no decisions or voting take place in this pre-board
meeting. Once in the formal board meeting, there is a discussion of the
technical document and if there are divergent opinions among the members
of the board, these are presented in terms of the document under con-
sideration. If there is a disagreement, for example, about increasing or
decreasing the interest rate and by how much, the board members will vote
and the aggregate results are published as described above.
As has been mentioned, although presidential re-election could, in theory,
have given the government more influence over the bank’s policy decisions, this
influence seems not to be as important as it could initially appear once we
consider the professional qualities of the appointed members, the way in which
9 See Mejı´a (2007) for a description of, and the rationale behind, the information released by
the bank after the board meetings are being held.
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the bank releases information on the actions of the members of the board in the
board meetings, and the process by which the board arrives at its decisions.
Despite the fact that the independence of the central bank was stipulated
in the Constitution of 1991, this has not prevented threats to the formal
independence of the bank from the government in periods of economic or
political turmoil. A recent example of such threats to the independence of
the central bank occurred in 2004 when the Colombian peso revaluated by
almost 9 per cent against the U.S. dollar. At the time, the President of the
Republic publicly asked the bank to control the revaluation by intervening in
the market, despite the bank’s policy at the time of only participating in the
market to reduce the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. As the bank did
not respond in the way the executive government desired, the President’s
office prepared a decree that would have taken away the bank’s foreign
exchange functions, passing them to the central government. Viewing this
as an inappropriate measure, several producer associations advised the
government not to pursue this initiative because of the negative consequence
it would have had.
Although the Constitution gave the bank independence from the gov-
ernment, the above example illustrates how independence may be changed
not only formally (by taking direct action to reduce it through constitutional
reforms), but also indirectly, by reducing the sphere of its activity through
presidential decrees.
Overall, the Colombian experience with central bank autonomy estab-
lished through the Constitution of 1991 seems to have been successful10. In
the period 1992-2008, the inflation rate fell to an average level of 12.5 per
cent. In addition, it is the only subperiod in which the trend in the inflation
rate is negative. Also, the variability of the rate fell to the lowest level among
the four subperiods discussed here, with a standard deviation around the
linear trend of 2.9.
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: WAS THERE A STRUCTURAL BREAK
IN THE EARLY 1990S?
A few years after the 1991 reform that gave the Colombian central bank a
higher degree of independence, there was some debate concerning whether
this new institutional arrangement was superior, in terms of reducing
inflation, to the earlier arrangements, in particular the Junta Monetaria
(Ferna´ndez Riva 1996; Meisel 1996). Since the reforms were very recent, it
was extremely difficult to analyze whether the evidence was consistent with
the hypothesis that the reforms had helped to lower the levels of inflation
10 For a review of the monetary policy implemented during this subperiod, see Kalmanovitz
(2001) and Go´mez (2006). Go´mez et al. (2002) and Betancourt and Vargas (2008) discuss the
implementation of inflation targeting in detail.
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significantly. At present, however, we have a sufficient number of observa-
tions to examine this issue using rigorous statistical methods.
In this section, we use quarterly data for the period 1980-2008 to explore the
hypothesis of whether there was a structural break in 1991 in the inflation
series. If the central bank did in fact make use of the new flexibility that inde-
pendence gave it to fight inflation, a structural break in the series of inflation
should be observed soon after the reform went into effect in 199111. We would
expect this break in the series as the inflation rate had been increasing, since the
early 1980s. We interpret these tests as a necessary condition for determining
whether the central bank independence in Colombia had an impact on inflation.
The tests we employ cannot tell us whether this effect (if any) is causal. How-
ever, the presence of a structural break in the appropriate year in the inflation
series would coincide with the strong institutional change that gave the central
bank more independence at the beginning of the 1990s.
Figure 4 shows the inflation series and the CUSUM and CUSUM of
squares tests (row 2) for the inflation series in Colombia. The reform that
established the independence of the central bank in Colombia was adopted in
1991. In addition, in the second column of the first row, the figure shows the
residuals of the model behind the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares test; this is
a univariate autoregressive model with five lags — AR(5). It is important to
point out that if our main hypothesis is correct (i.e. that there was a struc-
tural break in 1991), fitting a «well-behaved» model for the entire period
(1980:01-2008:04) will be very difficult.
The CUSUM test is based on the recursive residuals of the model. Figure
4, second row (column 1), presents the graphical representation of Rm ¼
s^1
Pm
t¼kþ1 rt for m ¼ k þ 1; . . . ; T; where rt stands for the recursive residual
(Maddala and Kim 1999). The straight, dashed lines are the probabilistic
bounds for the path of Rm under the null hypothesis (the level of the test is
5 per cent). The null hypothesis of no-break is rejected, if Rm crosses the
boundary. The aim of this test is to detect systematic changes in the coeffi-
cients of the model. On the other hand, the CUSUM of squares (second row)
plots Sm ¼ ð
PT
t¼kþ1 r
2
t Þ2
Pm
t¼i r
2
t for m ¼ k þ 1; . . . ; T. This test aims to capture
irregular changes in parameters. In a similar fashion to the CUSUM test,
the null hypothesis is rejected, if Sm crosses the boundary. The boundary in
the figure is at the 5 per cent level.
Figure 4 shows that there are some evidence consistent with systematic
parameter instability (CUSUM test) in Colombian inflation soon after the
new constitution gave the central bank its independence in 1991. The
CUSUM of squares tests finds evidence of irregular changes in parameters
Colombia, starting approximately in 1986 and ending in 2004. This is not
surprising given the high variability of the inflation series at the beginning of
11 This is not to say that this is the only explanation consistent with the data, but it does
constitute a necessary condition.
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the sample (see row one, column one). Moreover, the residuals of these
models (Figure 4, row one, column two) indicate the bad fit of the model
before the central bank independence (1991). In general, several other
models that were estimated have the same problem: either a good or bad fit
before the reform and a good or bad fit after the reform. This indicates that
no single model can accommodate the dynamics of inflation before and after
reform. It is also important to mention that if the model is not adequate in
terms of the assumptions about the properties of the error term, inference
about structural breaks might not be valid.
Although not all the tests show consistency with the hypothesis that there is
a break in the series of inflation, those that which are consistent are too
FIGURE 4
INFLATION SERIES AND TESTS OF STRUCTURAL BREAK IN THE INFLATION
SERIES, 1980-2008
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Notes: To obtain information for this figure, we estimate univariate AR(5) models for the quarterly
series of inflation for the period 1980-2008. The first row presents the CUSUM test, the second the CUSUM
of squares test and the third plots the residuals of the model. The reform to the central bank in Colombia
took place in 1991. Dashed lines represent boundaries for the tests at 5 per cent level. We cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no breakpoint at 1992q1 for Colombia using a Chow test (F, P-value5 0.2879).
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precise to be simply disregarded. This, in addition to the dramatic change in
the trend of inflation after the reform, the reduction in the variance in the
series, and results from other studies such as Otero and Ramirez (2006), seems
to indicate a structural break shortly after the establishment of central bank
independence. Although it is possible that some other factors caused the
reduction in inflation, the break in the series is consistent with the hypothesis
that the introduction of an independent central bank (and the policies that is
able to carry out) is an important determinant of the inflation rate.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we present a summary of the results of four phases of the
history of the Banco de la Repu´blica and the institutional arrangements that
created them. It is clear that the first period in the history of the bank (1923-
1951) has the best outcome from the point of view of the average level of
inflation. However, in terms of instability, the fourth period (1992-2008) has the
lowest standard deviation around the trend. Although the fourth period has the
third highest level of inflation, this period lasted only 18 years and the inflation
rate when it started was high. The trend in the inflation rate, nevertheless, is
negative and statistically significant. Thus, from a historical perspective, the best
results in terms of lower inflation were obtained with an independent central
bank pursuing autonomous objectives. The worst results in terms of inflation
are those for period three (1964-1991), which was characterized by a dependent
and unorthodox central bank. Although causality is hard to establish in this
case, the Colombian experience seems to suggest that central bank indepen-
dence and a clear mandate render the best outcome in terms of inflation.
For the period 1992-2008, the paper also discusses recent threats to the
independence of the central bank. These threats come either from direct sug-
gestions by the government on which policies the bank should follow, or
indirectly through political changes (e.g. presidential re-election), which give a
re-elected government the opportunity to appoint four members of the board.
The apparent loss of independence caused by the presidential re-election,
however, seems to have been balanced by the government’s incentives to
appoint prestigious economists as board members as well as by the way deci-
sions are taken within the board, and through the procedures followed for
releasing information to the public in terms of how the board members vote.
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